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THE LAW ON INSIDER TRADING LACKS
NEEDED DEFINITION
Roberta S. Karmel*
HE prosecution of insider trading has long been a key SecuritiesTand Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement priority. In addi-
tion to SEC civil actions, criminal prosecutions of traders on inside
information by the Department of Justice (DOJ) are also prevalent. Yet,
insider trading is not defined in the federal securities laws. It is, essen-
tially, a common law crime, interpreted by the courts. Further, the SEC
has not posited a theoretical justification for its insider trading program
beyond such platitudes as investor protection and fairness.
Initially, the ban against trading on inside information was justified
under the equal access to information theory.' However, this theory was
explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court.2 Later in the 1980s, during the
heyday of junk bond financing of tender offers, the SEC's insider trading
program concentrated on trading in advance of tender offers. From time
to time, security analysts have also been the focus of insider trading cases.
Most recently, the SEC and DOJ have aggressively pursued traders for
hedge funds. 3 According to Andrew Ceresney, the Director of the Divi-
sion of Enforcement, "[p]olicing insider trading has long been central to
the Commission's mission of ensuring confidence in the markets. '4 Over
the past five years, the SEC has prosecuted more than 590 defendants in
civil insider trading cases. 5
* Roberta S. Karmel is Centennial Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School. She is
a former Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Mary Ellen Stanley, a
student at Brooklyn Law School, was of assistance in the research for this article. The
author acknowledges a summer research grant from Brooklyn Law School.
1. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket
907 (Nov. 8, 1961).
2. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
3. See generally Matthew Goldstein, Ex-Trader at SAC Fund Is Sentenced to 3 Years,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2014, at Bi; Ben Protess & Matthew Goldstein, Appeals Court Deals
Setback to Crackdown on Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2014, at Al; Patricia
Hurtado, SEC Says House Insider Probe Involves 44 Funds, Entities, BLOOMBERG Busl-
NESS (July 18, 2014, 12:01 AM), http:lwww.bloomberg.comlnews/articles/2014-07-17/sec-
says-house-insider-trading-probe-involves-44-funds.
4. Oversight of the SEC's Division of Enforcement: Testimony Before the Subcommit-
tee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Capital
Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises (2015) (testimony of Andrew Ceresney,
Director Division of Enforcement), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/031915-
test.html#.VQ21t_nFTq.
5. Id.
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Insider trading cases tend to be headline-grabbing prosecutions, often
against colorful individuals. These blockbuster cases are used to prop up
the SEC's image as a tough cop on Wall Street, particularly after periods
of deregulation leading to market collapses and scandals. While I do not
believe that trading on insider information is salutary, or should be law-
ful, I do believe that the number and types of insider trading cases cur-
rently being brought by both the SEC and DOJ is a misallocation of
enforcement resources, especially since most prosecutions are of lower
level players, rather than high-level executives. Further, it is wrong for a
person to be jailed for an undefined crime. The absence of a well-articu-
lated justification for these prosecutions is also a problem. If the ban on
trading on inside information were anchored in the SEC's primary man-
date of full disclosure by public corporations, its enforcement would be
more viable from a theoretical perspective. Instead of continuing to de-
velop insider trading violations through litigation, the SEC should advo-
cate for a statutory definition of this currently undefined crime.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE IN THE COURTS AND
SEC PUSH BACK
The prohibition against trading on inside information under the federal
securities laws derives from Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.6 Rule 10b-5, makes
it unlawful for any person in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made ... not
misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit on any person.7
It is important to note that Rule lOb-5 makes no reference to insiders, but
prohibits certain fraudulent conduct by any person upon any other
person.
The typical insider trading case involves silence by a buyer or seller of
securities, and a failure by traders to disclose their possession of material
non-public information. Since no untrue statement is made, the violation
must implicate either clause (a) or (c) of Rule 10b-5. While Rule 10b-5
generally prohibits fraudulent and deceptive practices in the public secur-
ities markets, it does not outlaw all breaches of fiduciary duty or over-
reaching. 8 The term "inside information" is generally defined as
nonpublic information about events or circumstances related to a com-
pany's assets or earning power known only to corporate management and
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). In the 1980s, the SEC also
promulgated Rule 14e-3 under Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act to outlaw insider trading
in connection with tender offers. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2014).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
8. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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its confidants, and which can reasonably be expected to have a material
effect on the company's share price.9 However, some insider trading cases
do not involve this type of corporate information, but rather trading by
professionals on nonpublic market information, such as information
about an upcoming tender offer. Finally, insider trading violations can
also include the "tipping" of such information. 10 The SEC's web site
states that "illegal insider trading generally occurs when a security is
bought or sold in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust
and confidence while in possession of material nonpublic information."'"
As explained below, the SEC's definition appears to go beyond the hold-
ings of relevant case law.
The first insider trading case under Rule 10b-5 was In re Cady, Roberts
& Co.,12 an administrative action against a broker-dealer. This broker-
dealer's liability was rooted in the conduct of one of its principals, who
was the director of a corporation that decided upon a dividend cut.13 The
director left the board meeting and immediately sold securities in cus-
tomer accounts of the broker-dealer, including accounts in which he had
a beneficial interest.14 In finding that this conduct violated Rule 10b-5,
the SEC stressed the existence of a relationship that afforded the director
access to inside information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose.15 In addition, the SEC emphasized the unfairness of allowing a
corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading with-
out disclosure.16
The SEC's views on the illegality of insider trading were initially af-
firmed by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 17 In this
case, the SEC obtained an injunction against an issuer, its officers and
employees, forbidding them from trading and tipping others to trade
stock and options on the basis of material, undisclosed information con-
cerning a major copper strike by the issuer in Canada. The decision was
predicated on the theory that investors who trade on impersonal ex-
changes should have relatively equal access to material information. 18
The SEC argued in Texas Gulf Sulphur and subsequent cases that Rule
10b-5 requires a parity of information among all traders in the public se-
curities markets.
9. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
10. Id. at 852.
11. SEC Enforcement Actions, Insider Trading Cases, U.S. SECURITIES AND Ex-
CHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml (last modi-
fied Jan. 28, 2015).
12. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907
(Nov. 8, 1961).
13. Id. at 909.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 913.
16. Id. at 911-13.
17. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
18. Id. at 849.
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However, this view was not fully accepted by all SEC Commissioners,
and was later rejected by the Supreme Court. In re Investors Management
Co.19 was an administrative proceeding against investment advisers and
mutual fund managers who sold stock in McDonnell Douglas Corp. be-
cause they had received selective disclosure from the underwriter of
Douglas's debentures of a reduction in Douglas's earnings.20 The Com-
mission held that a person who obtains material, nonpublic corporate in-
formation, which he has reason to know emanates from a corporate
source and which places him in a position superior to other investors,
acquires a relationship with respect to that information giving rise to a
legal duty under Rule 10b-5.21 In a concurring opinion, Commissioner
Smith asserted that tippee responsibility must relate back to insider re-
sponsibility. More precisely, the tippee must know that the information
was given to him in breach of a duty by a person having a special relation-
ship to the issuer.22 Additionally, the information must be shown not only
to be material and nonpublic, but also to have substantially contributed
to the trading that occurred.23
Although the In re Investors Management Co. decision is forty-five
years old and there have been hundreds of insider trading prosecutions
since then, the differing perspectives of the majority of the Commission
and Commissioner Smith have never been resolved. The questions re-
maining from this debate include the following: (1) Is mere possession of
material and nonpublic information sufficient for a violation, or must
there be use or trading on the information; and (2) Must the tippee who
trades on the information know that it was given to him in breach of a
duty by a person having a special relationship with the corporation not to
disclose the information.
In Chiarella v. United States,24 the Supreme Court rejected the SEC's
parity of information theory, expressing the view that not every instance
of financial unfairness violates Rule 10b-5. 25 The Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction of a printer who learned about upcoming tender
offers for several target companies, purchased shares in the companies,
and then sold at a profit after the tender offer was announced. 26 The
names of the target companies were apparently coded rather clumsily,
and the printer figured out the code.27 Thus, he was not actually tipped by
anyone. The Supreme Court held that silence in connection with a
purchase or sale constitutes fraud only if liability is premised on a duty to
19. In re Investors Mgmt. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 9267, 44 SEC Docket 633
(Nov. 8,1971).
20. Id. at 636-37.
21. Id. at 641.
22. Id. at 640-41.
23. Id.
24. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
25. Id. at 231-32.
26. Id. at 224.
27. Id.
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disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence. 28
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella proved very important in the
development of insider trading law. He wrote that a rule, permitting par-
ties to an arm's length business transaction to refrain from disclosing in-
formation absent a confidential or fiduciary relation, "permits a
businessman to capitalize on his experience and skill in securing and eval-
uating relevant information; it provides incentive for hard work, careful
analysis, and astute forecasting. '29 Nevertheless, these very policies
should limit the doctrine so that "a person who has misappropriated non-
public information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or
refrain from trading."'30 Since Chiarella was a 5-4 decision, with Justice
Powell unwilling to address a theory that had not been argued below, the
misappropriation doctrine presumably commanded a majority of the
Court's justices. 31
The SEC, not willing to accept the Supreme Court's limited view of
insider trading violations, passed Rule 14e-3 to try and avoid the full im-
plications of Chiarella in the case of tender offers.32 Since so many of the
SEC's prosecutions at this time involved advance knowledge of tender
offers, Rule 14e-3 proved useful. In addition, the SEC and the DOJ pros-
ecuted numerous cases based on the misappropriation theory.
In Dirks v. SEC,33 however, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its rejection
of the equal access or parity of information theory.34 Dirks was an insur-
ance company analyst who, after receiving information from a former of-
ficer of Equity Funding, pursued an independent investigation and
discovered that Equity Funding was engaging in massive fraud.35 Dirks
kept both his clients and potential clients apprised of his investigation and
many of them sold Equity Funding stock. 36 Before the facts became pub-
lic, the price of Equity Funding stock fell from $26 to less than $15 a
share.37 The SEC brought an administrative case against Dirks arguing
that when tippees come into possession of material information they
know is confidential, they must publicly disclose it or refrain from trad-
ing.38 The Court overturned the SEC's sanctions against Dirks and held
28. Id. at 230. This was the common law rule. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431
(1909).
29. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
31. See generally Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2014) establishes a "disclose or abstain" from trading rule
for any person who is in possession of material information relating to a tender offer which
information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and emanates from the offeror
or target company. The SEC argued that this is a prophylactic rule and neither scienter nor
breach of duty was required for its violation. See Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No.
17120, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410 (Sept. 4, 1980).
33. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
34. Id. at 657-58.
35. Id. at 648-49.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 650.
38. Id. at 651.
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that a tippee's liability is derivative. 39 Thus, a tippee cannot be held liable
unless use of the information breaches a fiduciary duty that the tipper
owed to either its clients or its organization and, in addition, the insider
must have realized a personal benefit. This holding essentially endorsed
Commissioner Smith's prior opinion in Investors Management.40
After the Dirks decision, the SEC attempted to push back with regard
to selective disclosure. It attempted to distinguish Dirks in SEC v. Ste-
vens,41 in which a CEO placed a series of unsolicited telephone calls to
several securities analysts to advise them that quarterly results to be an-
nounced the next day would be lower than expected.42 The SEC asserted
that the CEO took this action for his personal benefit-enhancing both
his reputation and his status as a manager. 43 The case was settled, so this
theory was never tested in court. However, the SEC then adopted Regu-
lation FD to regulate the disclosure practices of public companies in their
communications with analysts. This regulation imposes a duty on public
companies that disclose material nonpublic information to analysts or
others in the securities industry to simultaneously disclose such informa-
tion publicly.44 Interestingly, Regulation FD was not promulgated under
Section 10(b) or (14) of the Exchange Act and cannot be the basis for a
private damages suit or criminal prosecution.
Another type of insider trading case the SEC believed the courts were
not properly interpreting involved the tipping of family members by in-
siders. In United States v. Chestman,45 a husband tipped a stockbroker
concerning information that the husband had learned from his wife, who
had learned it from her mother, who had learned it from his brother, a
corporate insider.46 The stockbroker traded on the information and was
subsequently prosecuted. 47 The Second Circuit overturned his Section
10(b) conviction, 48 holding that kinship did not suffice for establishing the
fiduciary relationship required by Chiarella and Dirks.49 In response, the
SEC then passed Rule 10b5-2, which defined circumstances in which a
person has a duty of trust and confidence for purposes of the misappro-
priation theory to include the following:
(1) [W]henever a person agrees to maintain information in confi-
dence; (2) whenever the person communicating the information and
the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern or
practice or of sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the in-
39. Id. at 659.
40. See generally In re Investors Mgmt. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 9267, 44 SEC
Docket 633 (Nov. 8, 1971).
41. SEC v. Stevens, Litigation Release No. 12813, 48 SEC Docket No. 9, at 739 (Mar.
19, 1991).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 17 C.F.R § 243.100 (2014).
45. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
46. Id. at 555.
47. Id.
48. However, his conviction under Rule 14e-3 was affirmed. Id. at 571.
49. Id. at 568.
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formation knows or should know that confidentiality is expected; or
(3) whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic infor-
mation from his or her spouse, parent, child or sibling; provided
however, that the person receiving or obtaining the information may
demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed with respect
to the information. 50
Whether the SEC has the power to reverse court decisions in this way,
especially for the purpose of creating criminal liability, is unclear.
Another unsettled issue after Dirks that the SEC also attempted to
settle by rulemaking was what causal connection has to be shown be-
tween a trader's possession of insider information and his trading. In
United States v. Teicher the Second Circuit took the view that "knowing
possession" is sufficient to establish insider trading liability.51 But in SEC
v. Adler, the Eleventh Circuit held that "use" was required.52 Addition-
ally, in United States v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit required that "use" be
proven in a criminal case because criminal intent cannot rest upon a legal
presumption.5 3 Once again, the SEC attempted to settle this issue
through rulemaking. In Rule 10b5-1, trading "on the basis" of material
nonpublic information is defined to mean if the trader "was aware of" the
inside information when he or she made the trade.54
The next insider trading case after Dirks to be heard by the Supreme
Court was United States v. O'Hagan, a criminal conviction of an attorney
who traded in the securities of a target company when the bidder was a
client of the defendant's law firm.5 5 In upholding the conviction under
both Rule 10b-5 and 14e-3, the Court endorsed the misappropriation the-
ory and held that the SEC could regulate non-deceptive activities as a
reasonably designed means of preventing manipulative acts under § 14(e)
of the Exchange Act.56 The Court did not specifically address whether
trading while in knowing possession of insider information was sufficient
to sustain a conviction, but described the crime as trading "on the basis of
material, nonpublic information. 57 In O'Hagan, it is noteworthy that Jus-
tice Scalia protested that a criminal conviction based on judge made law
contravened the principle of lenity.58
A case demonstrating the problems of limiting insider trading to
breach of fiduciary duty or misappropriation is SEC v. Dorozhko, in
which the defendant hacked into Thomson Financial's servers and stole a
confidential earning report from a company called IMS Health.59 He then
50. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2.
51. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993).
52. SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1338 (11th Cir. 1998).
53. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998).
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1.
55. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1997).
56. Id. 666-73.
57. Id. at 651-52.
58. Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2009).
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traded on the stolen information. 60 The defendant was an employee of
neither Thomson Financial nor IMS Health.61 The district court dismissed
the case, because there was neither a breach of a fiduciary duty nor a
misappropriation under the theories generally used in misappropriation
cases. 62 The Second Circuit reversed on a theory of affirmative
deception. 63
Perhaps emboldened by the Supreme Court's endorsement of insider
trader prosecutions in O'Hagan, and the Second Circuit's decision in
Dorozhko, the SEC and DOJ prosecuted insider trading cases with a ven-
geance. While most of these cases resulted in settlements or victories for
the Government, some recent and exceptionally significant losses suggest
that the SEC and DOJ may be pushing the envelope beyond the estab-
lished doctrines acceptable to judges and juries. 64
In the seminal case, United States v. Newman, the Second Circuit dis-
missed with prejudice a conviction against two portfolio managers who
were remote tippees.65 The court issued an opinion narrowing the param-
eters of the crime of trading on inside information. At the trial, the Gov-
ernment introduced evidence showing that a group of financial analysts
received information from insiders at Dell and NVIDIA that disclosed
earnings numbers before they were publicly announced.66 The analysts
then passed on this information to defendants Newman and Chiasson,
who executed trades in Dell and NVIDIA stock, earning $4 million and
$68 million, respectively, in profits for their respective hedge funds. 67 The
defendants were three or four steps away from the tippers and there was
no evidence that they were aware of the source of the inside information.
Further, there was no proof that the corporate insiders provided the in-
formation in exchange for a personal benefit.68 The instructions given to
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 49-51.
63. Id. at 49.
64. See SEC v. Steffes, No. 10-C-6266, 2012 WL 1144825 (N.D. Il. Apr. 5, 2012) (Rail-
way workers allegedly traded on material nonpublic information about the acquisition of
the railway company where they worked, based on observations of people dressed in busi-
ness attire touring the rail yard; jury found for the defendants); SEC v. Schvacho, 991 F.
Supp. 2d 1284 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (allegations that defendant traded on information about an
impending merger obtained from the CEO of the target company, a close personal friend;
case dismissed after a bench trial); SEC v. Cuban, No. 3:08-CV-2050-D, 2013 WL 791405
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2013) (Dallas Mavericks owner sold his ownership stake in Mamma.com
based on a potential Private Investment in Public Equity transaction that would have di-
luted the value of his shares; defendant claimed he never agreed to keep information confi-
dential; jury rejected all of the SEC's allegations); SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir.
2014), available at, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2014/lr23011.htm (alleged tip-
pee chain concerning an acquisition of SunSource by Allied Capital Corporation; jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of the defendant); SEC v. Moshayedi, 8:12-CV-01179-JVS-ANx
(D. Ca. filed June 11, 2014) available at, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-06/sec-
loses-latest-insider-trading-trial-to-former-stec-ceo.html (sale of large holding not can-
celled after learning bad news; jury returned a verdict for the defendant).
65. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
66. Id. at 443.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 444.
[Vol. 68
Law on Insider Trading
the jury stated that the Government needed to prove beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that,
the material, nonpublic information had been disclosed by the in-
sider in breach of a duty of trust and confidence ... he must have
known that it was originally disclosed by the insider in violation of a
duty of confidentiality.69
The Second Circuit found these jury instructions wanting, because
under Dirks it was necessary for the Government also to prove that the
tippees knew the breach of duty was for a personal benefit.70 Further-
more, the Court in Dirks also held that a tippee's liability is derivative.
Thus, a tippee cannot be held liable unless use of the information
breaches a fiduciary duty that the tipper owed to its clients or organiza-
tion and, in addition, the insider must have realized a personal benefit.71
In Newman, the Second Circuit interpreted this language as requiring
that the tippee must have known about the personal benefit in order to
be liable. 72 According to the court, "insider trading liability is based on
breaches of fiduciary duty, not on informational asymmetries. This is a
critical limitation on insider trading liability that protects a corporation's
interests in confidentiality while promoting efficiency in the nation's se-
curities markets. '73 The court therefore held that, in order to sustain an
insider trading conviction against a tippee, the Government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the following four elements:
(1) the corporate insider was entrusted with a fiduciary duty; (2) the
corporate insider breached his fiduciary duty by (a) disclosing confi-
dential information to a tippee (b) in exchange for a personal bene-
fit; (3) the tippee knew of the tipper's breach, that is, he knew the
information was confidential and divulged for personal benefit; and
(4) the tippee still used that information to trade in a security or tip
another individual for personal benefit.7 4
Moreover, the court took a narrow view of what might constitute a
personal benefit, rejecting the idea that mere friendship was sufficient. 75
Rather, the benefit must be objective, consequential, and represent a po-
tential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature. 76 The court found
the Government's evidence with regard to a pecuniary benefit as insuffi-
cient under this standard and therefore reversed the convictions and re-
manded with instructions that the indictment be dismissed with
prejudice.77 The holding of the Newman court, that the benefit of leaking
information by a tipper cannot rest on friendship alone, is a variation of
69. Id.
70. Id. at 450.
71. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647 (1983).
72. Newman, 773 F.3d at 450.
73. Id. at 449.
74. Id. at 450.
75. Id. at 452-53.
76. Id. at 452.
77. Id. at 453.
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this stumbling block from earlier cases, 78 and ultimately raises a question
as to the validity of Rule 10b-2.
II. STATUTORY DEFINITIONS
The SEC has generally resisted a definition of the wrong of insider
trading on the grounds that such a definition would be a blueprint for
fraud. Instead, it has merely passed rules to clarify the contours of insider
trading in response to restrictive court decisions, as explained above. In
the mid-1980s there was a serious attempt at a legislative enactment to
define insider trading. However, such efforts never came to fruition,
largely due to SEC intransigence.
In 1987, both the Senate79 and House 8° proposed bills defining insider
trading. Additionally, the SEC proposed its own bill. 81 An important dif-
ference between these proposals was the liability provisions. The Senate
bill and the SEC proposal would have given contemporaneous traders the
right to recover damages; the House bill was a criminal statute. However,
the proposals floundered on the controversy of possession versus use. The
Senate bill attempted to outlaw,
information ... used or obtained wrongfully only if it has been ob-
tained by, or its use would constitute, directly or indirectly, theft,
conversion, misappropriate or a breach of any fiduciary, contractual,
employment, personal or other relationship of trust and
confidence. 82
The SEC objected to this definition and after hearings, proposed a pro-
hibition on trading while in possession of material, nonpublic information
only if such information
has been obtained by, or its communication would constitute, di-
rectly or indirectly (A) theft, bribery, misrepresentation, espionage
(through electronic or other means) or (B) conversion, misappropri-
ation, or any other breach of any personal or other relationship of
trust and confidence, or breach of any contractual or employment
relationship. 83
The substitution of "possession" for a "use" standard proved too con-
troversial and no action was taken on insider trading until the next ses-
sion of Congress, when the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988 was passed. 84 This law significantly increased
the sanctions for insider trading violations, but nevertheless did not con-
tain any definition of insider trading.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
79. S. 1380, 100th Cong. (1987).
80. H.R. 1238. 100th Cong. (1987).
81. Insider Trading Act of 1987, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1284 (1987).
82. S. 1380, at 2.
83. Accompanying Letter, and Analysis by Ad Hoc Legislation Committee, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1817 (1987).
84. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 100-
704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified at various subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 & 80b-4a).
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Currently, there are once again bills pending in Congress to define in-
sider trading. These bills were introduced in an effort to counteract the
Newman decision. The House bill would amend Section 10 of the Ex-
change Act to make it unlawful, "to purchase or sell any security, or any
securities-based swap agreement, based on information that the person
knows or, considering factors including financial sophistication, knowl-
edge of and experience in financial matters, position in a company, and
amount of assets under management, should know is material informa-
tion and inside information. '85 Further, "inside information" is defined as
nonpublic, and obtained illegally, "directly or indirectly from an issuer
with an expectation of confidentiality or that such information will only
be used for a legitimate business purposes or in violation of a fiduciary
duty." 86
The Senate bill would amend Section 10(b) to prohibit any person
(A) To purchase, sell, or cause the purchase or sale of any security on
the basis of material information that the person knows or has rea-
son to know is not publicly available, (B) To knowingly or recklessly
communicate material information that the person knows or has rea-
son to know is not publicly available to any other person under cir-
cumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such
communication is likely to result in a violation of subparagraph
(A). 8 7
The Senate bill also defines "not publicly available" to "not include
information that the person has independently developed from publicly
available sources." 88
Although insider trading is generally viewed as wrongful, an overly
broad definition could thwart legitimate corporate research. The threat
this doctrine poses to security analysis has long been a barrier to statutory
resolution of the problems with insider trading doctrine. How the SEC
will react to the current efforts to define this violation remains to be seen.
Moreover, in the current dysfunctional Congress, the chance of a bill de-
fining insider trading gaining traction appears problematic. Nevertheless,
the United States is out of step with most other jurisdictions in its lack of
specific and clear legislation outlawing trading on insider information. 89
III. PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
Being against the ban on insider trading is like being against mother-
hood and apple pie, but in the midst of the SEC's aggressive enforcement
of insider trading bans in the 1980s, some intrepid law and economics
academics have argued that insider trading can be beneficial. This argu-
85. Ban Insider Trading Act, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015).
86. H.R. 1173 § 2(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).
87. Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. § 2 (d)(1)(A) (2015).
88. S. 702 § 2(2).
89. Edward Greene & Olivia Schmid, Duty-Free Insider Trading?, 2013 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 369, 424 (2013).
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ment was first put forward by Henry Manne, who claimed that insider
trading contributes to efficiency in stock market pricing and, in any event,
insiders should be allowed to pocket the proceeds of trades on inside in-
formation as part of their compensation. 90 This idea was endorsed by
others who claimed that insider trading regulation is unnecessary and
counterproductive because it frustrates prompt price adjustment to new
private information. 91 In rebuttal, most scholars condemned trading on
inside information as unfair and wrong, primarily because giving insiders
asymmetrical advantages erodes public confidence in the market. 92
One critique of the prevailing rationalization of insider trading bans is
that the justification rests to some extent on the parity of information
theory rejected by the Supreme Court. The acceptance of the misappro-
priation theory as a basis for insider trading bans then led to the property
rights justification. 93 The property right theory was endorsed by the Su-
preme Court in O'Hagan, where the Court stated: "A company's confi-
dential information ... qualifies as property to which the company has a
right of exclusive use. The undisclosed misappropriation of such informa-
tion, in violation of a fiduciary duty ... constitutes fraud akin to embez-
zlement. ' 94 The trouble with this theory is that the federal securities laws
are concerned with fairness and the protection of investors, not the pro-
tection of business property rights in information.
My view has long been that the ban on insider trading is necessary to
maintain the SEC's disclosure system.95 If insider trading could be en-
gaged in with impunity, as urged by Henry Manne and Daniel Fischel,
there would not be an incentive for public companies to make prompt
disclosure of nonpublic information, especially information not required
to be disclosed by regulation. The SEC's Regulation FD is an effort to
abolish selective disclosure by public companies. Nevertheless, to the ex-
tent Regulation FD chills communications between public companies and
security analysts, it may be too blunt an instrument for encouraging the
dissemination of public company information. The SEC assumes that in-
formation about public companies should get into the securities markets
only through SEC disclosure documents, but this regime can add to mar-
90. See Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 1967 DUKE L.J. 456
(1966).
91. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 253 (1991); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation
of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983).
92. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Eco-
nomic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35, 55-62 (1986); Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders,
and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322
(1979); Kim Lane Scheppele, "It's Just Not Right": The Ethics of insider Trading, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., 123 (1993); William K.S Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Informa-
tion on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under Rule
lOb-5, 54 CAL L. REV. 1217, 1234-35 (1981).
93. See Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of Rules
Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984).
94. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997).
95. See Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information-A Breach
in Search of A Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 113-16 (1998).
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ket volatility. When a lid has been kept on material news and that news is
then put out, it can result in almost instantaneous and sharp changes in
the price of a company's stock. In today's fast markets, the general public
is not in a position to absorb the information and trade on it before mar-
ket professionals do so. So what is a very rigorous ban on insider trading
accomplishing?
Trading on market information, and particularly information about an
upcoming tender offer, has a different focus. In such situations, the ban
on trading on inside information is for the protection of the bidder. How-
ever, as a policy matter, it is unclear why the bidder should be protected.
The SEC could eliminate much of the insider trading that is fodder for its
enforcement cases if it closed the ten-day window during which bidders
need not announce a tender offer.96
I am not advocating in favor of trading on inside information, but I
believe that the Government is utilizing too many resources chasing after
insider traders for the sake of bringing prosecutions, without an analysis
of how these cases are implementing general SEC policies, especially with
regard to disclosure. The "disclose or abstain" from trading doctrine is
quite an artificial construct as applied to tippees and remote tippees. The
SEC's program with regard to insider trading, instead of racking up pros-
ecutions, should instead be aimed at compelling issuers and bidders to
make prompter disclosure.
In recent years, many of the insider trading prosecutions were aimed at
hedge funds and expert networks, without an articulation by the Commis-
sion as to its goals or how it believes hedge fund activities are contrary to
the public interest. Why does the SEC believe that the "edge" hedge
funds are seeking is unfair or otherwise destructive of investor confi-
dence? In the past, the SEC took similar aim at security analysts. Does
the SEC believe that it should enjoy a monopoly on the transmission of
information that is issued by a public company into the marketplace? Or
should public companies be making more timely disclosures?
So far, the SEC seems to have a knee jerk reaction of responding to the
Newman case by claiming it is wrong and will stand in the way of further
prosecutions. As a result, it will bring insider trading cases administra-
tively, rather than in the courts where judges and juries can overturn the
government's prosecutorial decisions.97 Instead of continuing with this
enforcement precedent, the SEC should review its insider trading pro-
gram to articulate the underlying policies for the program and refine the
types of cases that are central to the program.
The Supreme Court and now the Second Circuit seem critical of the
SEC's and DOJ's theories underlying their more aggressive insider trad-
ing prosecutions. While the SEC is unhappy with these seminal court de-
cisions, it should nevertheless tailor its prosecutions to the law set forth
96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2014).
97. See Yin Wilczek, SEC to Pursue More Insider Trading Cases In Administrative
Forum, Director Says, Corp. L. & Accountability Rpt. (BNA) (June 11, 2014).
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by the Supreme Court and encourage Congress to define insider trading
violations by statute. Some of the Government's motivation in prosecut-
ing so many insider trading cases may have been to burnish its image
after the Madoff debacle and the 2008 financial meltdown, but losing
cases does not enhance the SEC's reputation.
